Some fundamental realities need to be kept in mind when understanding post US-NATO pull out Afghanistan otherwise, the conclusions might be significantly wrong:
1. Afghanistan has a strong social and ethnic structure - Pashtuns have historic binds with Pashtuns in Pakistan and that is not going to change. Non-Pashtuns (for the lack of better phrase, let’s call them Northern Alliance) have been against Pashtuns simply for existential reasons. The area has a history of supporting their clans - whether right or wrong.
2. Non-Pashtuns (for convenience of understanding, let’s call then Northern Alliance) are nowhere as united as they were in the post 90s era. The economy has been growing for a few years now; and that has pushed them to line-up with different centers of 'higher economic gains'.
3. There are many suggestions in the media that Pakistan's Afghan policy was crafted in stone in 90s and can never change. This is light-years from truth. Pakistan's policy (whatever the author likes to call it) has been changing to adopt the international environment. It rides on the historic ties and it supports a stable and progressing Afghanistan.
4. Growth of any economy depends on many factors - one of the most important among them is the capacity of its own human and other resources to support itself. Afghanistan, and other countries investing there including US, China, India, Pakistan and others) will need to spend on the country's internal capacity to ensure that whichever government comes in next - Taliban or no-Taliban - can demonstrate its control. No future government stands a chance of real delivery without that.
5. The world knows Afghanistan through the lens of international media - mostly US and Indian. The realities are pretty different. Many regional countries including China, Pakistan and Iran have been using a policy of 'let media be the media – let’s focus on realities'. These countries have made strong non-Taliban based inroads in the Afghan society particularly focusing on helping Afghanistan use its natural resources and strategic location (read 'oil & gas corridor') to its best advantage.
6. Indian economy is continually going down for about a year now. Projected surveys do not include India in the world powers in 2030 - not even close to it. It might soon find its 700-million-people-below-the-poverty-line baggage too heavy to handle; and may be left with little economic space to invest in Afghanistan.
7. Yes, Taliban are savage, they are trigger (or blow-thyself) happy, they like-shedding blood, they are self-righteous. But will they remain so forever? Especially after the world - including Pakistan - has started telling them clearly that they will need to change if they want a serious stake in post-pull-out Afghanistan? This is a risky assumption and I won’t make it. Taliban include saner element and they might choose to reform themselves for power - and perhaps to gain international acceptance.
8. The world knows Afghanistan as a single country - but the truth is that never in history has there been a single government (or power) that ruled the entire area covering Afghanistan. Not even King Zahir Shah, Northern Alliance, Taliban or the US-NATO regime. Whoever rules the post pull-out Afghanistan is not likely to hold power over more than 60% of the country. And if it is a non-Pashtun dominated rule, the figure can be well below 50%.
9. The energy corridor from Central Asian states passes through Afghanistan: Yes. But then it’s not the complete truth. Depending on which country's resources we are talking about - there are alternate routes (Readers may like to open the map of Central Asia to understand the context). For example, China has boundaries with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It can reach all other Central Asian countries through any of these three; Pakistan can reach all these countries through China; Caspian Sea bypasses Afghanistan. The only thing that makes Afghanistan very important is the Gwadar port of Pakistan. If this port is to become the center of trade in the region, the best way to get cheap fuel down and Chinese + Western goods up is through Afghanistan. Now this is where the trick is: The readers will need to go deep into Afghanistan’s map to understand what ‘internal corridor’ is important for this trade. There are many alternates within Afghanistan for this route. Currently, the provinces through which the best 'internal routes' pass are controlled by Taliban. This is not going to change for better in the post pull-out times and this is where the world is interested.
10. The figures used by media about poppy cultivation defy some of the most prestigious studies on the subject. In-fact, one of the plumes in Taliban government’s hat in late 90s was that they have drastically reduced the poppy cultivation and trade. But then, obviously, just because Taliban did not grow or sell poppy does not mean they can go around killing people around the world.
Thanks,
Nadeem
1. Afghanistan has a strong social and ethnic structure - Pashtuns have historic binds with Pashtuns in Pakistan and that is not going to change. Non-Pashtuns (for the lack of better phrase, let’s call them Northern Alliance) have been against Pashtuns simply for existential reasons. The area has a history of supporting their clans - whether right or wrong.
2. Non-Pashtuns (for convenience of understanding, let’s call then Northern Alliance) are nowhere as united as they were in the post 90s era. The economy has been growing for a few years now; and that has pushed them to line-up with different centers of 'higher economic gains'.
3. There are many suggestions in the media that Pakistan's Afghan policy was crafted in stone in 90s and can never change. This is light-years from truth. Pakistan's policy (whatever the author likes to call it) has been changing to adopt the international environment. It rides on the historic ties and it supports a stable and progressing Afghanistan.
4. Growth of any economy depends on many factors - one of the most important among them is the capacity of its own human and other resources to support itself. Afghanistan, and other countries investing there including US, China, India, Pakistan and others) will need to spend on the country's internal capacity to ensure that whichever government comes in next - Taliban or no-Taliban - can demonstrate its control. No future government stands a chance of real delivery without that.
5. The world knows Afghanistan through the lens of international media - mostly US and Indian. The realities are pretty different. Many regional countries including China, Pakistan and Iran have been using a policy of 'let media be the media – let’s focus on realities'. These countries have made strong non-Taliban based inroads in the Afghan society particularly focusing on helping Afghanistan use its natural resources and strategic location (read 'oil & gas corridor') to its best advantage.
6. Indian economy is continually going down for about a year now. Projected surveys do not include India in the world powers in 2030 - not even close to it. It might soon find its 700-million-people-below-the-poverty-line baggage too heavy to handle; and may be left with little economic space to invest in Afghanistan.
7. Yes, Taliban are savage, they are trigger (or blow-thyself) happy, they like-shedding blood, they are self-righteous. But will they remain so forever? Especially after the world - including Pakistan - has started telling them clearly that they will need to change if they want a serious stake in post-pull-out Afghanistan? This is a risky assumption and I won’t make it. Taliban include saner element and they might choose to reform themselves for power - and perhaps to gain international acceptance.
8. The world knows Afghanistan as a single country - but the truth is that never in history has there been a single government (or power) that ruled the entire area covering Afghanistan. Not even King Zahir Shah, Northern Alliance, Taliban or the US-NATO regime. Whoever rules the post pull-out Afghanistan is not likely to hold power over more than 60% of the country. And if it is a non-Pashtun dominated rule, the figure can be well below 50%.
9. The energy corridor from Central Asian states passes through Afghanistan: Yes. But then it’s not the complete truth. Depending on which country's resources we are talking about - there are alternate routes (Readers may like to open the map of Central Asia to understand the context). For example, China has boundaries with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It can reach all other Central Asian countries through any of these three; Pakistan can reach all these countries through China; Caspian Sea bypasses Afghanistan. The only thing that makes Afghanistan very important is the Gwadar port of Pakistan. If this port is to become the center of trade in the region, the best way to get cheap fuel down and Chinese + Western goods up is through Afghanistan. Now this is where the trick is: The readers will need to go deep into Afghanistan’s map to understand what ‘internal corridor’ is important for this trade. There are many alternates within Afghanistan for this route. Currently, the provinces through which the best 'internal routes' pass are controlled by Taliban. This is not going to change for better in the post pull-out times and this is where the world is interested.
10. The figures used by media about poppy cultivation defy some of the most prestigious studies on the subject. In-fact, one of the plumes in Taliban government’s hat in late 90s was that they have drastically reduced the poppy cultivation and trade. But then, obviously, just because Taliban did not grow or sell poppy does not mean they can go around killing people around the world.
Thanks,
Nadeem
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